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Abstract
The paper studies simple strategies of labor tax reform in a search and matching
model of the labor market featuring endogenous labor supply. Changing the composition
of the tax wedge|that is, reducing a payroll tax and increasing a progressive wage tax
such that the marginal tax wedge remains una®ected|increases employment, reduces the
equilibrium unemployment rate, and increases public revenue as long as workers do not
have all the bargaining power in wage negotiations. A strategy of replacing employment
taxes by payroll taxes increases employment and reduces the equilibrium unemployment
rate, while the e®ect on public revenue is ambiguous.
JEL codes: J3, J680.
Keywords: equilibrium unemployment, employment taxes, invariance of incidence
proposition, payroll taxes, search and matching model, labor tax reform, and wage tax.
1 Introduction
Labor tax reform continues to be a key item on the policy agenda of many European countries.
The high tax wedges1 of these countries are often seen as one of the main culprits of their high
equilibrium unemployment rates. A piecemeal reduction in the marginal tax wedge is therefore
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1The nominal tax wedge is typically de¯ned as the di®erence between the gross labor costs that the ¯rm has
to pay and the after-tax wage income of workers, which equals the sum of marginal income taxes, social security
contributions paid by employees and social security contributions paid by employers. In this view, compulsory
social security contributions are considered to be more akin to a tax than a social insurance premium from
which individuals derive personal rights. The real tax wedge corrects the nominal tax wedge for consumption
taxes, such as value-added tax and excises, but is not considered in this paper.
1a common measure found in European tax reform programs aimed at stimulating employment.
In particular, policy makers have recommended cuts in payroll taxes to reduce unemployment
(for example, OECD (1994)).2 Moreover, some observers claim that the composition of the
tax wedge matters to employment and real wages. They argue that shifting the composition
of the tax wedge from payroll (or employers') taxes to wage (or employees') taxes could
increase employment. Indeed, in view of governments' revenue needs, several OECD countries
have taken this approach in reforming their direct tax system. For example, Hungary cut its
employers' social insurance contribution rates by 11 percentage points during 1994-1999, while
increasing its e®ective personal income tax rates from 24 percent to 28 percent so as to keep
the tax wedge constant. Several other Central and Eastern European transition countries|
featuring high rates of unemployment and overstretched public ¯nances|still have to decide
on their structural reform strategies. A pivotal policy question is therefore whether a shift
in the composition of the tax wedge would be of help in alleviating the unemployment and
budgetary problems of these countries.3
As a matter of general principle, it is well known that in perfectly competitive labor
markets the invariance of incidence proposition holds. This proposition says that it does not
matter to gross wages, net wages, and employment whether (statutory) labor taxes are levied
on workers or ¯rms.4 It is not immediately evident, however, whether payroll and wage taxes5
are equivalent in an imperfectly competitive labor market. For example, unions are unlikely
to accept a wage reduction to o®set an increase in payroll taxes, but may agree to refrain
from wage increases if wage taxes are increased. Empirical studies employing wage-bargaining
models|for example, Lockwood and Manning (1993) and Holm, Honkapohja and Koskela
(1994)|suggest that payroll and wage taxes have quite di®erent e®ects on wage formation.
Various econometric studies ¯nd that a shift from payroll taxes to wage taxes decreases ¯rms'
wage costs (see Symons and Robertson (1990)).
Few formal studies have analyzed the invariance of incidence proposition in imperfectly
competitive labor markets, where households and ¯rms may have di®erent degrees of bargain-
ing power over wages and thus di®er in their ability to shift labor taxes. Koskela and SchÄ ob
(1999) employ a \right-to-manage" trade union model6 and ¯nd that a revenue-neutral sub-
2Empirical studies on the employment e®ects of payroll taxes generally ¯nd small negative e®ects (see
Hamermesh (1993)). Summers (1989) argues that the e®ect may even be negligible if workers value the social
security bene¯ts|that is, health care services, unemployment protection and pension allowances| enough so
that they are willing to accept a lower wage in combination with these bene¯ts.
3See Ligthart (1999) for further details on the Hungarian tax reform.
4This raises the question why, in practice, social security contributions are divided between employers and
employees. Musgrave and Musgrave (1987) argue that the legislative intent may have been to share the tax
burden equally, although this does not say anything about the economic incidence. Other factors may play a
role as well such as liability to tax evasion and tax administration concerns.
5Wage taxes are de¯ned to include all taxes levied on employees (for example, personal income taxes and
employees' social security contributions) whereas payroll taxes refer to all labor taxes levied on employers.
6In this setup, ¯rms bargain with unions over the wage subject to the restriction that employment is on
2stitution of wage taxes for payroll taxes has no e®ect on employment. Picard and Toulemonde
(2001) obtain a similar result in an e±ciency wage model. So far, little attention has been
paid to labor tax incidence issues in search-theoretic models of the labor market. A notable
exception is Boone and Bovenberg (2002), who focus on the optimal design of labor taxation
in a search framework, however, and Pissarides (1998), who provides a numerical analysis of
the employment e®ects of changes in the wage tax. None of these authors, however, have
focused on the allocation and welfare e®ects of the kind of labor tax reform described below.
The ¯rst purpose of the paper is to analyze|employing a search and matching model
of the labor market|whether a coordinated wage-payroll tax reform, which reduces payroll
taxes and increases wage taxes so as to keep the marginal tax wedge constant, would a®ect
employment. Rather than focusing on a revenue-neutral tax reform, as is common in the
literature so far (for example, Koskela and SchÄ ob (1999)), our reform considers a strategy
of keeping the marginal tax wedge constant. This simple and practicable strategy7 is shown
to yield e±ciency gains|in terms of a smaller search externality to job-seeking workers,
yielding higher employment|without jeopardizing public revenue if the wage tax structure
is progressive. Indeed, public revenue is shown to increase. Moreover, such a reform strategy
is to yield welfare increases even if there are pre-existing ¯scal distortions.8
The second aim of the paper is to study whether the form of taxation|that is, speci¯c
versus ad valorem taxes|matters to its qualitative e®ect on wages and employment. In
perfectly competitive markets the distinction is immaterial, but this is not necessarily true
for imperfect labor markets. Recently, Pisauro (1991) and Rasmussen (1998) have addressed
this issue in e±ciency wage models. Pisauro (1991) shows that an employment tax (that
is, a speci¯c or head tax on the number of employees) increases real wages whereas an ad
valorem payroll tax depresses real wages. Rasmussen (1998) extends Pisauro's analysis to the
long run and shows that a balanced budget substitution of employment taxes for payroll taxes
leads to higher employment. Our paper studies a coordinated payroll-employment tax reform,
which involves reducing the employment tax while increasing the payroll tax so as to keep
the wage costs of the ¯rm constant at a given wage rate. Such a strategy increases aggregate
employment and reduces the equilibrium unemployment rate, but has an ambiguous e®ect on
public revenue.
Our approach embeds Pissarides' (1990) search-theoretic framework in a simple intertem-
poral macroeconomic model of a small open economy with endogenous labor supply.9 The
the labor demand curve. See also Heijdra and van der Ploeg (2002, Chapter 8).
7In contrast to revenue-neutral restructuring strategies, the marginal tax wedge can readily be calculated
on the back of an envelope. Furthermore, our strategy allows us to focus on the composition of the tax wedge
and thus abstract from the e®ects of a change in the level of the marginal tax wedge.
8The few tax reform studies dealing with imperfectly competitive labor markets typically do not pay
attention to welfare e®ects.
9Shi and Wen (1999) also consider endogenous labor supply in an intertemporal search and matching model
of unemployment to study the allocation and welfare e®ects of labor and capital income taxes.
3framework features °ows in the labor market from the creation of new jobs and the (exoge-
nous) destruction of existing jobs. It is assumed that job-seeking workers and vacancy-o®ering
¯rms match in a stochastic fashion. This modeling setup gives rise to a search externality that
is represented by agents' contact probabilities as a function of labor market tightness. By
endogenizing the household's labor supply decision|which is exogenous in Pissarides' model
(1990)|and allowing for pre-existing labor taxes, we are able to study tax incidence issues.
In particular, a linear tax scheme with an income threshold is considered to study the e®ects
of tax progressivity on employment. This builds on the work of Koskela and Vilmunen (1996)
and Pissarides (1998), who have found that progressive taxes can be good for employment
in a partial equilibrium bargaining model. Our results show that progressive taxes are also
bene¯cial to employment in a search and matching model with endogenous labor supply.
Speci¯cally, we show that the degree of progressivity matters to the allocation e®ects of a
coordinated wage-payroll tax reform.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the basic search-theoretic model,
which is extended for endogenous labor supply. Section 3 studies the two types of labor tax
reform experiments. Section 4 concludes.
2 A Simple Search and Matching Model
2.1 Firms
The economy consists of a large number of risk-neutral ¯rms producing a homogeneous good
under perfect competition.10 The representative ¯rm employs L(t) units of labor to produce
output, Y (t), according to a simple linear production function:
Y (t) = ®0L(t); ®0 > 0; (1)
where ­0 is a (constant) productivity index. The price of ¯nal output is normalized to unity.
Physical capital is abstracted from for reasons of simplicity.11 The ¯rm's labor stock ad-
justs sluggishly because it has to post vacancies, V (t), and ¯nd workers to ¯ll them. New
employment is de¯ned as the di®erence between job creation, q(t)V (t), and job destruction,
sL(t):
_ L(t) ´ q(t)V (t) ¡ sL(t); (2)
where q(t) represents the probability of the ¯rm ¯nding an unemployed worker with whom
it concludes a deal (and thus 1=q(t) is the expected duration of a vacancy) and s is the
10For convenience, the number of ¯rms is ¯xed and normalized to unity.
11Abstracting from capital keeps the analysis anytically tractable. The model cannot, however, allow for a
change in the factor intensity in response to a change in the tax mix. See Section 4 for a further discussion.
4exogenous job destruction rate.12 A dot above a variable denotes a time derivative (for
example, _ L(t) = dL(t)=dt).





Y (z) ¡ °0V (z) ¡ wP(z)L(z) ¡ ¿ZL(z)
i
e¡r(z¡t)dz; (3)
where AP(t) is the value of the ¯rm, °0 is the (constant) °ow cost per vacancy, wP(t) ´
w(t)(1 + ¿E) denotes the producer wage, w(t) is the before-tax wage, ¿E is a payroll (or ad
valorem) tax, and ¿Z is an employment (or speci¯c) tax on the total number of hours worked.
The rate of interest (r) is given, re°ecting that the domestic economy is small in world capital
markets.
The ¯rm is assumed to have perfect foresight. It chooses time paths of employment and
vacancies in order to maximize (3) subject to the production function (1) and the employment
accumulation constraint (2). Optimal ¯rm behavior is characterized by:
¸E(t)q(t) = °0; (4)




[®0 ¡ ¿Z ¡ wP(z)]e¡(r+s)(z¡t)dz; (6)
where ¸E(t) is the value of an additional worker in the planning period, which is equal to the
present discounted value of the surplus the ¯rm earns on that job (see equation (6)), using
r + s as the e®ective discount rate.13 According to (4) the ¯rm chooses its vacancies such
that the value of an additional worker is equalized to the expected recruitment costs (that is,
°0=q(t)). Equation (5) says that the value of the ¯rm should equal the replacement value of
its labor force.
2.2 Households
The representative household comprises in¯nitely many members caring only about the life-
time utility enjoyed by the household unit at time t. Lifetime utility of the representative




logX(z)e¡½(z¡t)dz; ½ > 0; (7)
where ½ denotes the pure rate of time preference and X(t) is full consumption, which is de¯ned
as the sum of the value of goods consumption and the opportunity cost of leisure consumption.
12The assumption of a constant job break-up rate is common in the literature and not too unrealistic for
purposes of comparative statics, but less suitable if one wants to study short-run dynamics. The present paper
focuses on the former, however. See Mortensen and Pissarides (2003) for a model that endogenizes the job
break-up rate.
13Equation (5) follows from integrating forward the ¯rst-order condition for the state variable, L(t), and




5Following Greenwood, Hu®man and Hercowitz (1988), full consumption is speci¯ed in such a
way that the wealth e®ect on the household's labor force participation decision is eliminated:





LP(t)(¾+1)=¾; ¾ ¸ 0; (8)
where C(t) denotes private consumption, LP(t) ´ U(t) + L(t) denotes labor force participa-
tion, U(t) is time spent searching while unemployed, and ¾ is the intratemporal labor supply
elasticity. Labor supply is exogenous if ¾ = 0. The household has a time endowment of
unity so that leisure is de¯ned as M(t) ´ 1 ¡ U(t) ¡ L(t). Each employed worker pays a
wage tax (¿L) on its wage income above a certain threshold a ¸ 0:14 After-tax wage income
amounts to (wN(t)+¿La)L(t); where wN(t) = w(t)(1¡¿L) denotes the after-tax \marginal"
wage and wA = wN(t) + ¿La is the consumer (or after-tax \average") wage. Unemployed
workers receive an unemployment bene¯t denoted by b, which is constant and untaxed. The
household's °ow budget identity is then given by:
_ A(t) ´ rA(t) + [wN(t) + ¿La]L(t) + bU(t) + T(t) ¡ C(t); (9)
where A(t) is the stock of real tangible assets and T(t) are lump-sum transfers or taxes (if
T(t) < 0). The household's wealth portfolio, A(t), consists of shares in domestic ¯rms, AP(t);
and net foreign assets, AF(t):
At each instant of time, f(t)U(t) unemployed household members ¯nd a job, but some
employed members, sL(t), lose their job owing to idiosyncratic shocks. Then, employment
evolves according to:
_ L(t) ´ f(t)U(t) ¡ sL(t); (10)
where f(t) denotes the worker-¯nding rate for the ¯rm (to be determined in Section 2.4).
The optimization problem of the household can be solved in two stages. The ¯rst stage
involves solving for the optimal time pro¯le of full consumption by maximizing (7) subject to
the household's budget constraint (9) and the transversality conditions:
lim
z!1´A(z)A(z)e¡½(z¡t) = lim
z!1´L(z)L(z)e¡½(z¡t) = 0; (11)
where ´A(t) and ´L(t) are the co-state variables associated with the state variables A(t) and
L(t). The optimization problem yields:15
_ X(t)
X(t)
= r ¡ ½; t 2 [0;1); (12)
X(t) = ½[A(t) + H(t)]; t 2 [0;1); (13)
14In the background the following linear tax function is employed: ¨(t) ´ ¡a + ¿Lw(t), where a ¸ 0 is a
tax allowance. If a = 0 the tax system is proportional, otherwise it is progressive. See Section 2.3 for a further
discussion.
15In Section 2.5, it is shown that a meaningful steady state requires that r = ½, thereby yielding a °at pro¯le
for full consumption.













where wR(t) is the household's reservation wage. Equation (12) shows that full consumption
growth is equal to the di®erence between the rate of interest and pure rate of time preference.
The household consumes a constant proportion of its total wealth, comprising ¯nancial wealth
and after-tax human wealth (see (13)).
In the second step, full consumption is optimally allocated over its components:
U(t) + L(t) = w¾









(s + f(º) + r)dº
i
dz; (16)
where ¸L(t) ´ ´L(t)=´A(t) is the pecuniary value of an additional job and wR(t) is the worker's
reservation wage. Labor market participation is a positive function of the reservation wage
(equation (15)), which is de¯ned as the sum of the unemployment bene¯t and expected value
of a job. Equation (16) shows that the value of an additional job is the present discounted
value of the \dividend" earned on the job, consisting of the excess of net labor income over
the household's reservation wage.
2.3 Government Budget and Tax Progression
Lump-sum transfers to households, T(t), and outlays on unemployment bene¯ts, bU(t), are
covered by revenue from a payroll tax, a wage tax and an employment tax:
T(t) + bU(t) = [¿Ew(t) + ¿L(w(t) ¡ a)]L(t) + ¿ZL(t): (17)
In line with general practice, wage taxes are taken to be progressive, whereas social security
contributions are assumed to be proportional.
A useful measure of the degree of tax progression is the coe±cient of average tax progres-
sion:16












Both tax wedges are expressed as a percentage of the producer wage as is common in the
literature. The tax system is progressive (that is, the average tax burden rises with the wage)
16To keep matters simple, the employment tax is not included in the de¯nition of the tax wedge and is thus
not incorporated in the measure of average tax progression either.
7if ª(:) > 0, which is satis¯ed for a > 0; whereas the tax system is proportional for a = 0.
An increase in one of the wage tax parameters (¿L or a) at a given wage rate yields an
increase in average tax progression, whereas an increase in the payroll tax reduces average
tax progression ceteris paribus. Tax progression can also change owing to a change in the
wage at a given tax rate. This is analyzed further in Section 3.
2.4 Job Matching and Wage Bargaining
Firms with vacancies and job-seeking workers are matched in a stochastic fashion. The
matching function, Z(t) = U(t)"V (t)1¡"; 0 · " · 1; describes the number of labor contracts,
Z(t), that are concluded given the number of job seekers and vacancies (Pissarides, 1990).




= µ(t)1¡"; f0 > 0 > f00; (20)
where f[µ(t)] measures the Poisson probability that a vacancy will be ¯lled in a speci¯c time
interval dt, µ(t) ´ V (t)=U(t) is the relative number of traders in the market (an indicator
of labor market tightness) and f(µ(t)) = µ(t)q(µ(t)); so that q0 > 0 > q00; where q(µ(t)) ´
Z(t)=V (t). De¯ning " as the (absolute value of the) elasticity of the q(µ(t)) function (0 < " ´
¡µq0(µ)=q(µ) < 1) it can be determined that 1 ¡ " is the elasticity of the f(µ(t)) function.
When a ¯rm with a vacancy and a job-seeking worker meet, a local monopoly rent is cre-
ated by the encounter, which is equal to ¸i
E+¸i
L, where the superscript i indicates a particular
¯rm-worker pairing. Upon separation this rent is lost. The division of the rent between the
worker and the ¯rm is determined by bargaining over the wage rate. The generalized Nash









; 0 · Â · 1; (21)
where Â and 1 ¡ Â represent the bargaining power of the worker and the ¯rm, respectively.
Since all ¯rms are identical they all choose the same wage. The wage resulting from the
bargaining process can be written as follows:
w(t) = Â
µ
®0 + °0µ(t) ¡ ¿Z
1 + ¿E
¶






where it is assumed that w(t)(1 ¡ ¿L) + ¿La > b so that it pays o® to work: The negotiated
wage is a weighted average of the ¯rm's surplus|consisting of the marginal product of labor
and the foregone search costs (°0µ(t)) adjusted for payroll and employment taxes|and the
tax-adjusted unemployment bene¯t (that is, b¡¿La
1¡¿L > 0 because b > a). The marginal tax
rates depress wages because they reduce the surplus of the match, but also because ¯rms
and workers save on tax payments by agreeing to keep wages low. If employers have all the
bargaining power, that is, Â = 0; the negotiated wage is constant over time. In that case,
employers' taxes and employment taxes do not a®ect wage setting.
82.5 Steady State and Stability
In steady state, total employment is not changing, although there are still labor market
°ows taking place. From (10) an expression for the equilibrium unemployment rate (that is,
u(t) ´ U(t)=LP(t)) can be obtained, that is, u¤ = s=(s+f(µ¤)), where asterisks denote steady-
state values. Also, in steady state, the rate of interest equals the pure rate of time preference
(r = ½), so that there is no transition in full consumption (that is, _ X(t) = 0). Without
anticipation e®ects of policy changes, there are no transitional dynamics in µ;f;q;¸L;¸E and
w either. This is summarized in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 Without anticipation e®ects, there are no transitional dynamics in µ, q, f,
¸E, ¸L, wR, and w. These variables jump to their new steady-state values following an
unanticipated and permanent shock to any of the model parameters (s, r, ­0, °0, ", ½) or
policy variables (a;b;¿L;¿E;¿Z).
Proof. See Appendix, Section A.1.
The model can be graphically summarized by two schedules in the (w;µ) space (see Panel
(a) of Figure 1). The wage setting (WS) schedule (see (A.5) in the Appendix, Section A.2)
is upward sloping. At higher rates of labor market tightness the worker gets a larger share
of the pure rents associated with a labor contract (via a higher wage). The vacancy creation
(VC) curve (see (A.4) in the Appendix) is downward sloping and convex toward the origin,
re°ecting diminishing returns in vacancy creation. Intuitively, if there are more vacancies,
unemployment is lower because unemployed households ¯nd it easier to locate a job. The long-
run equilibrium is represented by E0: Panel (b) of Figure 1 shows the Beveridge Curve (BC),
which is downward sloping and convex to the origin in the (V;U) space The ray through the
origin represents the equilibrium unemployment-vacancy ratio (the indicator of labor market
tightness (LMT)). Equilibrium unemployment and vacancies are at the intersection of the
LMT and BC curves.
3 Tax Reform Analysis
This section develops the two labor tax reform strategies set out in the Introduction. It
is assumed that all changes in the policy variables are permanent and unanticipated. The
government balances its budget at each point in time via lump-sum transfers/taxes. The
formal derivations can be found in the Appendix.
3.1 Substituting Wage Taxes for Payroll Taxes
Consider a labor tax reform which involves simultaneously cutting a payroll tax by d¿E < 0





















Figure 1: Substituting Wage Taxes for Payroll Taxes
Á ´ (1+¿E)=(1¡¿L) > 1 for ¿L;¿E > 0. Due to the positive initial wage and payroll taxes,
the objective of keeping the marginal tax wedge constant does not yield an equiproportionate
absolute change in tax rates. For convenience, the initial employment tax has been set to
zero. This reform leaves the marginal tax wedge entirely una®ected, while the average tax
wedge declines, and the degree of average tax rate progression increases. In terms of Panel
(a) of Figure 1, the WS curve rotates to the left and the VC curve shifts to the right, pushing
up the wage rate. The new steady state (E1) lies to the north east of the old equilibrium
(E0) if the wage tax is progressive. In that case, the shift in the VC curve dominates the shift
in the WS curve. Proposition 2 shows that such a reform has desirable e®ects on economic
e±ciency|it yields a smaller search externality to workers and a higher level of employment
in the new steady state|for a progressive wage tax. The result is extremely sharp as it is as
close to practicability as one could hope for.17
Proposition 2 A cut in the payroll tax coordinated with a rise in the wage tax that keeps
the marginal tax wedge unchanged strictly increases employment, labor market tightness, the
before-tax wage rate, and average tax progression i®: (i) the wage tax schedule is progressive;
and (ii) workers do not have all the bargaining power in wage negotiations.
Proof. See Appendix, Section A.3.1.
17Alternatively, we could have studied a revenue-neutral wage-payroll tax reform. Such a reform is less closely
in line with a simple and practicable strategy as discussed in this paper, because it is not straightforward for
policy makers to assess whether a particular tax change would yield a revenue-neutral outcome. Below, however,
it is shown that under the assumption of a proportional wage tax schedule the two tax reform strategies are
identical in their economic e®ects.
10The proposed reform yields a lower rate of unemployment without increasing the marginal
tax wedge if two conditions are satis¯ed. First, workers should not have all the bargaining
power in wage negotiations (that is, 0 < Â < 1), otherwise they could demand a wage
increase large enough to fully compensate for the wage tax rise, making vacancy creation more
expensive to ¯rms. Second, the wage tax structure should be progressive (that is, a > 0).18
This somewhat counterintuitive result can be explained by the intratemporal income e®ect
in labor supply; households will work harder to compensate for the income loss associated
with the higher rate of tax progression. Producer wages are sure to fall, thereby increasing
the value of an additional job to the ¯rm. Consumer wages rise, despite the increase in the
wage tax, inducing households to supply more hours of labor. Clearly, the presence of a tax
allowance moderates the increase in before-tax wages because the bene¯t of wage increases is
reduced owing to increasing tax progression. In sum, under a progressive wage tax, the reform
increases employment via two channels: (i) increased labor force participation, particularly if
the labor supply elasticity is large, workers have a lot of bargaining power, and the tax exempt
threshold is large; and (ii) a reduction in the unemployment rate, owing to ¯rms opening up
more vacancies.19
If the Hosios (1990) condition|that is, the worker's relative bargaining power equals the
elasticity of the matching function|holds and initial labor taxes and the unemployment rate
are zero, introducing a progressive wage tax does not yield any ¯rst-order welfare e®ect. In
that case, the decentralized market outcome coincides with the socially e±cient solution.
With pre-existing labor taxes, a coordinated wage-payroll tax yields a welfare improvement
if the su±cient conditions set out in Proposition 3 are met:
Proposition 3 Substituting a progressive wage tax for a linear payroll tax yields an increase
in welfare if the following su±cient conditions hold: (i) Â ¸ " so that workers have a su±cient
amount of bargaining power; and (ii) initial unemployment bene¯ts are not too large (if labor
supply is very elastic). If labor supply is exogenous and the Hosios (1990) condition is met,
welfare unambiguously rises.
Proof. See Appendix, Section A.4.
What is the e®ect of the reform on public revenue? Without tax base e®ects, a negative
revenue e®ect would materialize. Intuitively, the tax rate on a relatively large tax base (that
is, the payroll base) is reduced while the tax rate on a relatively small base (that is, the
wage income base) is increased.20 The reform, however, increases the tax bases|via higher
18It is easy to show that Proposition 2 would not hold if households enjoy a tax credit rather than an
individual tax allowance.
19Thus, with inelastic labor supply (that is, ¾ = 0) the labor tax reform would still increase employment
through the unemployment channel.
20Note that, in practice, this is not so clear cut. Personal income taxes may include certain employment
bene¯ts (for example, a company car) and exclude certain expenses (for example, interest payments on a
11wages and employment|thereby more than o®setting the negative tax rate e®ect. If labor
supply is su±ciently inelastic aggregate unemployment falls too (see equation (A.17) in the
Appendix), causing a fall in unemployment outlays. Accordingly, net lump-sum transfers|
that is, gross public revenue minus unemployment outlays|rise by more than gross public
revenue. Proposition 4 summarizes the revenue e®ects.
Proposition 4 Cutting a proportional payroll tax while increasing a progressive wage tax so
as to keep the marginal tax wedge constant increases public revenue.
Proof. See Appendix, Section A.3.1.
Propositions 2-4 provide for a surprisingly simple way of reaping the bene¯ts from labor
tax reform without jeopardizing the government's revenue position. All that is needed is a
reallocation of the statutory burden from the proportional payroll tax to the progressive wage
tax while keeping the marginal tax wedge constant. The employment and revenue dividends,
however, depend crucially on the progressive nature of the wage tax system. The insight that
progressive taxes can be good for employment in imperfectly competitive labor markets is
not new.21 What this study contributes is that this conclusion carries over to policy relevant
labor tax reform experiments in search and matching models. Moreover, the previous studies
have not looked at the revenue and welfare implications of tax reform experiments.
If the wage tax does not provide for an initial allowance, thus yielding a proportional tax
system, then:
Corollary 1 Cutting a proportional payroll tax while increasing a proportional wage tax so
as to keep the marginal tax constant leaves employment, unemployment and public revenue
una®ected.
The revenue e®ect is zero because with proportional taxes the wage and payroll tax bases
are equal. In addition, agents' wage setting power is irrelevant to the macroeconomic out-
come. Accordingly, the distribution of the statutory burden of payroll and wage taxes does
not matter, just like in a setting of a perfectly competitive labor market.22 It is then im-
mediately apparent that fully replacing the payroll tax by a proportional wage tax would
not a®ect employment and public revenue either. This equivalence result is closely related to
Koskela and SchÄ ob's (1999) result obtained in a \right-to-manage" trade union model with
exogenous labor supply, which thus carries through in a search and matching environment
with endogenous labor supply.
mortgage) from taxable income, whereas payroll taxes are levied upon salary with few such adjustments.
21See, for example, Koskela and Vilmunen (1996) for an application to trade union models. Pissarides (1998)
reaches a similar conclusion employing a numerical study of a wage tax cut in a search and matching model.
22Picard and Toulemonde (2001) show|in a perfectly competitive labor market|that a revenue-neutral





















Figure 2: Substituting Payroll Taxes for Employment Taxes
3.2 Substituting Payroll Taxes for Employment Taxes
The second tax reform experiment consists of cutting the employment tax while increasing the
payroll tax so as to keep the ¯rm's cost of labor constant at a given wage rate. Under perfect
competition, this would be a trivial issue because it does not matter to employment whether
labor taxes are de¯ned in speci¯c form (employment tax) or ad valorem form (payroll tax).
In imperfectly competitive labor markets, it is generally relevant in what form labor taxes are
levied. Indeed, Pisauro (1991) ¯nds in a moral-hazard e±ciency wage model that employment
and payroll taxes both depress employment, whereas the payroll tax reduces after-tax wages,
but the employment tax increases the after-tax wage. Replacing employment taxes by payroll
taxes is then expected to yield a positive e®ect on employment.23 Below, we show that this
line of reasoning is relevant to search and matching models too.
Our reform experiment involves keeping ¯xed ¼ ´ ¹ w(1 + ¿E) + ¿Z, where ¹ w is the given
(before-tax) wage rate, so that d¿E = ¡d¿Z=w > 0; with d¿Z < 0. Accordingly, the rise in the
payroll tax is smaller than the absolute value of the employment tax change. At a given wage
rate, the ¯rm's employment decision would not be a®ected by such a reform, but allowing for
a wage change could give rise to e±ciency gains in the new steady state.
Employment and payroll taxes have qualitatively the same comparative static e®ects on
labor market tightness and wages|both variables fall upon a tax increase as long as ¯rms do
not have all the bargaining power|but di®er in their quantitative e®ects. The fall in labor
market tightness is larger under an employment tax than under a payroll tax. In terms of
Panel (a) of Figure 2, the reform leaves una®ected the VC curve, but rotates down the WS
curve, thereby moving the equilibrium from E0 to E1. Consequently, the wage rate falls and
23Pisauro (1991) did not look into the issue of labor tax reform, however.
13labor market tightness rises, yielding a fall in the unemployment rate (as is shown in Panel
(b) of Figure 2). Due to the lower wage rate households will supply less hours of labor. In
addition, the reform depresses ¯rm's labor costs, inducing ¯rms to open up more vacancies and
hire more labor from the pool of unemployed households. Accordingly, aggregate employment
increases. Proposition 5 summarizes these positive e±ciency e®ects.
Proposition 5 Combining a reduction in the employment tax with an increase in the payroll
tax while holding constant the ¯rm's cost of labor at a given wage increases employment and
labor market tightness and reduces the equilibrium unemployment rate if and only if none of
the players has full bargaining power.
Proof. See Appendix, Section A.3.2.
What is the e®ect of the coordinated payroll-employment tax reform on public revenue?
The employment tax has a smaller base than the payroll tax so that without tax base e®ects a
smaller increase in the payroll tax is needed to raise the same amount of revenue. Indeed, the
reform is designed in such a way that the tax rate e®ect is zero. Matters are quite di®erent if
tax bases change as well. The fall in the wage rate depresses the wage tax base, but the rise
in employment increases the employment tax base. As a result, the e®ect on public revenue
is ambiguous. Proposition 6 summarizes the result.
Proposition 6 Cutting the employment tax and raising the payroll tax while holding constant
the ¯rm's cost of labor at a given wage rate has an ambiguous e®ect on public revenue.
Proof. See Appendix, Section A.3.2.
4 Concluding Remarks
Many European countries face high equilibrium unemployment rates at a time when their
public ¯nances are already overstretched. Therefore, policy makers have shifted their atten-
tion away from resource-intensive public subsidies to resource-conserving reforms of the labor
tax structure as ways to address the unemployment problem. The formal theory on labor tax
reform o®ers surprisingly little guidance on what kind of reform policy makers should embark
on to reduce equilibrium unemployment without putting the government's revenue position
at risk. In this context, the paper has developed a simple search and matching model of
the labor market, which allows for endogenous labor supply and various labor taxes on the
employers' and employees' side. With the aid of the model, two simple and practicable labor
tax reform strategies are studied.
It is shown that a strategy of cutting a payroll tax and increasing a progressive wage tax
so as to keep the marginal tax wedge constant, yields a \double dividend" if workers have less
14than complete bargaining power. It reduces the equilibrium unemployment rate and increases
public revenue. Aggregate unemployment is reduced too if labor supply is su±ciently inelastic
so that the increase in aggregate employment dominates the labor market participation e®ect.
Welfare increases even in the presence of ¯scal distortions and endogenous labor supply as
long as the rate of unemployment bene¯ts is not too high. If wage taxes are proportional,
however, the reform does not a®ect employment, public revenue and welfare.
The second strategy involves a piecemeal reduction in the employment tax accompanied
by a rise in the payroll tax so as to keep the ¯rm's labor costs constant at a given wage rate.
This reform yields a reduction in the wage rate, which reduces the ¯rm's labor costs, thereby
increasing aggregate employment. Public revenue rises if the additional revenue generated by
the positive employment e®ect exceeds the drop in revenue owing to a fall in the wage tax
base.
The analysis has abstracted, it should be emphasized, from physical capital so that the
personal income tax applies to labor income only. Allowing for physical capital would broaden
the income tax base. Because of such di®erences in the income tax base, a shift from payroll
taxes to income taxation would involve an increase in the overall rate of capital taxation,
thereby favoring labor-intensive production methods. In that case, a shift in the composition
of the tax wedge would have real e®ects even if the labor income tax is proportional. In
addition, the analysis assumed constant unemployment bene¯ts. The equivalence between
proportional payroll taxes and wage taxes is expected to break down if unemployment bene¯ts
are dependent on wage or social security contribution rates. Further limitations of the analysis
stem from ignoring compliance and tax administration issues. Social security contributions
are withheld at source and are therefore more di±cult to evade than personal income taxes,
which is self assessed in most industrialized countries. A shift from payroll taxes to personal
income taxes may then reinforce the positive employment e®ects though.
Mathematical Appendix
This Appendix presents the formal analysis underlying the results described in the main
text. First, it sets out the approach taken to solve the model. Then, it studies the compar-
ative statics of the labor tax reform scenarios. Finally, the welfare e®ects of the reforms are
discussed.
A.1 Steady State and Stability (Proposition 1)
In order to study the out-of-steady-state dynamics of the model, an equation is derived for
the key dynamic variable (that is, µ(t)). By substituting the time derivative of (6) in the time
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where use is made of q(t) = µ(t)¡" (where ¡_ q(t)=q(t) = "_ µ(t)=µ(t)). By using (22) the wage




































Accordingly, equation (A.3) is an unstable di®erential equation in µ(t) and the only econom-
ically sensible solution is that µ(t) is equal to its constant steady-state value µ¤. Following
an unanticipated and permanent shock to any of the exogenous variables, µ(t) immediately
jumps to its new steady-state value. Accordingly, without anticipation e®ects, there are no
transitional dynamics in µ; f; g; ¸E, ¸L and w:
A.2 Loglinearized System
In steady state,24 the model can be reduced to two equations and two unknowns (that is,
w(t) and µ(t)), which de¯ne the graphical apparatus. The vacancy creation (VC) schedule
and the wage setting (WS) schedule are given by:
®0 ¡ w(t)(1 + ¿E) ¡ ¿Z = (r + s)°0µ(t)"; (A.4)
w(t) = Â
µ
®0 + °0µ(t) ¡ ¿Z
1 + ¿E
¶






where the vacancy creation curve follows from substituting (6) into (4) and noting (20).
The model is non-linear and therefore can be log-linearized around the initial steady state
(SS). A relative change of a variable is denoted by a tilde (~), for example ~ µ ´ dµ=µ (except




















24To save on notation, the asterisks identifying steady state values have been dropped.



















w(1 + ¿E) ¡ (1 ¡ Â)Á(b ¡ ¿La)
#
~ ¿E;
where Á ´ (1+¿E)=(1¡¿L) > 1: This allows us to solve the model for ~ µ(t) and ~ w(t); which,
on their turn, determine the equilibrium unemployment rate and vacancy rate.
A.3 Allocation E®ects
A.3.1 Coordinated Wage-Payroll Tax Reform (Propositions 2 and 4)
Perturbing the marginal tax wedge, ¿M(see (19)) and setting d¿M = 0 yields Ád¿L = ¡d¿E >
0; where d¿E > 0: By substituting this expression in equations (A.6)-(A.7) and imposing
















w(Âf + "(r + s)) ¡ (1 ¡ Â)"(r + s)a




(1 + ¿E)(1 ¡ ¿L)
+
(1 ¡ Â)[Âf(b ¡ ¿La) + "(r + s)(b ¡ a)]
(1 ¡ ¿L)2 (Âf + "(r + s))
> 0;
where use is made of (22) in going from the ¯rst to the second line of (A.9). It is assumed
that b > a > ¿La so that the second term on the second line of (A.9) is positive. Labor
market tightness rises as long as a > 0; Â 6= 1 and search costs (°0) are bounded.
















> 0; a 6= 0; (A.10)
where the elasticity of the producer wage with respect to the tax change (²P











"(r + s)(1 ¡ Â)(a=w)










= 1 + ²P
¿L; (A.12)
where (A.12) represents the tax elasticity of the wage rate. Average tax progression increases
particularly if the initial wage tax, the elasticity of the producer wage and the initial tax
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"(r + s)(1 ¡ Â)(1 + ¿E)a
[Âf + "(r + s)](1 ¡ ¿L)
< 0; (A.14)
so that the consumer wage increases whereas the producer wage falls.
Di®erentiating the expression for the steady-state unemployment rate, u = s=(s+f) (from















· 0; f0(µ) > 0; (A.15)
where the unemployment rate is de¯ned in the usual fashion as the proportion of job seekers
in the labor force, that is, u = U=LP: The change in employment follows from di®erentiating
L = (1 ¡ u)w¾
R (which is derived by substituting U = w¾
R ¡ L (from equation (15)) in


























The ¯rst term on the right-hand side of (A.16) is the positive labor force participation e®ect|
which is increasing in the labor supply elasticity|and the second term of (A.16) is the un-
employment rate e®ect. If labor supply is exogenous (that is, ¾ = 0),25 the ¯rst term drops
out. In that case, employment still rises, but by less, owing to the absence of the labor supply


























If the labor supply elasticity is zero, workers have all the bargaining power or search costs are
zero, unemployment is sure to fall.








¿E + ¿L ¡ (a=w)(1 ¡ ¿L)
1 ¡ ¿L
¶














which follows from linearizing the right-hand side of (17). The ¯rst term of (A.18) represents
the tax rate e®ect, which is negative if ¿E + ¿L > (a=w)(1 ¡ ¿L); requiring that initial labor
taxes should not be too small. The second and third term of (A.18) are the wage tax base
25If labor supply is exogenous then U + L = 1 so that changes in aggregate unemployment and the unem-
ployment rate mirror changes in aggregate employment (that is, du = dU = ¡dL).
18e®ect and the employment tax base e®ect, respectively, which are both positive. Substituting








"(r + s)(1 ¡ ¿L ¡ (1 ¡ Â)(¿E + ¿L)) + Âf(1 ¡ ¿L)
[Âf + "(r + s)](1 ¡ ¿L)
¶
L (A.19)







where 1¡¿L ¡(1¡Â)(¿E +¿L) > 0 for reasonable parameter values, implying that the ¯rst
term of (A.19) is positive. If all taxes are proportional the ¯rst and second term are zero.
Net public revenue is de¯ned as RN ´ R ¡ bU: If aggregate unemployment falls, the rise in
net public revenue exceeds that of gross public revenue.
A.3.2 Coordinated Payroll-Employment Tax Reform (Propositions 5-6)
The ¯rm's labor cost can be de¯ned by ¼ ´ ¹ w(1 + ¿E) + ¿Z: Keeping the ¯rms labor cost
constant at a given wage yields d¿E = ¡d¿Z=w > 0; where d¿Z < 0. By substituting this







Â(1 ¡ Â)[®0 + °0µ ¡ ¿Z ¡ Á(b ¡ ¿La)]f








Â(1 ¡ Â)"(r + s)[®0 + °0µ ¡ ¿Z ¡ Á(b ¡ ¿La)]
[Âf + "(r + s)](1 + ¿E)2 < 0; (A.21)
where use has been made of (22). It is assumed that w(1 ¡ ¿L) + ¿La > b from which it
follows that ®0 + °0µ ¡ ¿Z ¡ Á(b ¡ ¿La) > 0. Note that labor market tightness is una®ected
by the tax reform if workers have all the bargaining power (that is, Â = 1) or ¯rms have all
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If ¯rms have a lot of bargaining power the ¯rst term of (A.22) is negative and dominates the
second term if, in addition, a and b are small. In that case, the producer wage falls. The e®ect
on the ¯rm's labor costs is negative, which results from (A.21). Obviously, the consumer wage
falls too. The decline in the unemployment rate and rise in aggregate employment follows
26Here it is assumed that 0 < Â < 1:



































































where the ¯rst term represents the tax rate e®ect, which drops out. The second and third
term are of opposite sign. Public revenue rises if the positive employment e®ect (third term)
dominates the negative wage base e®ect (second term).
A.4 Welfare E®ects (Proposition 3)








) ½¤(t) = log½ + log[A(t) + H(t)]; (A.27)
where use is made of r = ½: Maximizing welfare is equivalent to maximizing total wealth,
which is de¯ned as ­(t) ´ A(t)+H(t): Total wealth can be rewritten by using (3), (14), and
(17):













where it should be borne in mind that variables like f(µ) and wR are at their steady-state
values. The term in square brackets on the right-hand side of (A.28) can be rewritten as:








By using (10) we can write _ L(t) + (s + f)L(t) = fw¾










R + e¡(s+f)(z¡t)L(t); (A.30)
20where L(t) is the initial stock of employment. By using (A.29) and (A.30) we can rewrite
(A.28) as:
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Equation (A.31) expresses ­(t) in terms of the predetermined variables (that is, AF(t) and
L(t)) and labor market tightness (µ) for given values of the policy variables.
A.4.1 Exogenous Labor Supply
We ¯rst look at a special case of the model for which labor supply is exogenous (that is,
¾ = 0). Equation (A.31) reduces to:
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¶
[f + ½L(t)] ¡ °0µ
¸
: (A.33)
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s + f + ½
¶·
(®0 + °0µ)(1 ¡ ") ¡
°0
q
(s + f + ½)
¸
; (A.34)
where 1¡" ´ µf0(µ)=f(µ), f(µ) ´ µq(µ), and we have assumed that the economy is initially in
the steady state (so that L(t) = L¤ = f=(s + f); where asterisks denote equilibrium values).
The term in square brackets on the right-hand side of (A.34) is simpli¯ed as follows:





(s + "f + ½)
= ®0(Â ¡ ")
µ
s + f + ½
s + Âf + ½
¶
+ (1 ¡ Â)¿P
µ
s + "f + ½
s + Âf + ½
¶
; (A.35)
where the composite pre-existing tax rate, ¿P; is given by:
¿P ´
·






where we have used ¸E = °0=q = (1¡Â)(®0¡¿Z ¡Á(b¡¿La))=(s+f +½) (from (4), (6) and
(22)) to eliminate °0=q in going from the ¯rst to the second line of (A.35). By substituting





















(Â ¡ ")®0 + (1 ¡ Â)¿P
µ
s + "f + ½
s + f + ½
¶¸
; (A.38)
21so that the sign of the welfare e®ect is fully determined by ©: If the Hosios (1990) condition
holds, that is, Â = "; and there are no pre-existing ¯scal distortions (that is, ¿Z = b =
a = 0) then a labor tax change does not have a ¯rst-order welfare e®ect. In that case, the
decentralized market outcome coincides with the socially optimal outcome. If the Hosios
(1990) condition is met, but pre-existing labor taxes and unemployment bene¯ts are positive,
a coordinated wage-payroll tax reform (with a > 0) raises welfare.
A.4.2 Endogenous Labor Supply
For endogenous labour supply (that is, ¾ > 0) we need to recognize the endogeneity of the
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where © is de¯ned in (A.38), ¿M is given by (19) and ! is:
0 < ! ´
s + f + ½
s + Âf + ½
< 1: (A.41)
Note that we have made use of L¤ = fw¾
R=(s + f); U¤ = sw¾
R=(s + f) and (A.32) in deriving






















Su±cient conditions for the coordinated wage-payroll tax reform to yield an increase in welfare
are that: (i) Â ¸ " so that workers have a su±cient amount of bargaining power; (ii) initial
unemployment bene¯ts are not too large or labor supply is not too elastic; and (iii) wage
taxes are progressive.
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